Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing

Review of Market Design Concept Proposal

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Agenda

- Background
- Review of Market Design Concept Proposal (MDCP)
- Next Steps
- Appendix I: Current Transmission Constraint Pricing Logic
- Appendix II: Rationale for the Proposed Transmission Demand Curve Structure for Non-Zero CRM Facilities
- Appendix III: Rationale for the Proposed Transmission Demand Curve Structure for Current Internal Zero CRM Facilities



Previous Presentations

Date	Working Group	Discussion points and links to materials
Feb 15, 2019	Market Issues Working Group (MIWG)	Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing - Market Design Concept Proposal
October 2, 2018	Market Issues Working Group (MIWG)	Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing - Study Review
August 7, 2018	Market Issues Working Group (MIWG)	Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing – High Level Design Considerations
June 25, 2018	Market Issues Working Group (MIWG)	Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing - Analysis Update
April 10, 2018	Market Issues Working Group (MIWG)	Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing - Study Approach



Background



Background - Current Transmission Constraint Pricing (TCP) Logic

- The NYISO assigns a constraint reliability margin (CRM) to facilities and interfaces to help manage transmission modeling uncertainty.
 - A zero value CRM is applied to facilities that are generally located within a generation pocket, as well as external
 interfaces.
- The following limits on Shadow Prices are applied in instances of transmission shortages (implemented on June 20, 2017)

Facility Type	Demand (MW)	Demand Curve Price (\$)	Price Cap		
Non-Zero CRM	Up to 5 >5 to 20	\$350 \$1,175	\$4,000		
Zero-CRM	N/A	N/A	\$4,000		

- For facilities with a non-zero value CRM, the software will seek redispatch at a shadow price up to \$4,000 per MW, with consideration of the 20 MW of relief afforded by the two-step demand curve mechanism.
- For zero value CRM facilities, the software will seek redispatch at a shadow price up to \$4,000 per MW, without consideration of any demand curve mechanism.
- In situations where insufficient resource capacity is available to fully resolve a constraint, "relaxation" is applied.¹



¹For further information regarding the current implementation, please see Appendix I.

Background

- The NYISO completed a study of the current transmission constraint pricing logic in September 2018.¹
 - The study included a number of recommended considerations with respect to potential enhancements to the current TCP logic
- The NYISO presented a Market Design Concept Proposal in February 2019.²

1 Link to the Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing study:

 $\underline{\text{https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2549789/Constraint\%20Specific\%20Transmission\%20Shortage\%20Pricing\%20-\%20Paper_Final.pdf/7f69227a-7ca8-656e-b895-0f8147635319}$

2 Link to the Constraint Specific Transmission Shortage Pricing Market Design Concept Proposal:

https://www.nviso.com/documents/20142/5020603/Constraint%20Specific%20Transmission%20Shortage%20Pricing%20 MDCP 021519.pdf/d7d80189-e48e-a893-a860-6e4b9636b8bf



Market Design Concept Proposal

- In its February 15, 2019 presentation, the NYISO proposed to implement a revised approach to the current TCP logic consisting of the following components:
 - 1. Establish a revised six-step transmission demand curve mechanism for facilities currently assigned a non-zero CRM value.
 - 2. Apply a non-zero CRM value to internal facilities currently assigned a zero value CRM, with a separate demand curve mechanism for such facilities.
 - 3. Maintain the current single value \$4,000 shadow price capping method for external interface facilities (zero value CRM) permitting the continued use of constraint relaxation.



Overview of Market Design Concept Proposal: Non-Zero CRM Facilities




Market Design Concept Proposal

- Non-Zero CRM Facilities: The NYISO proposes to implement a revised, six-step transmission demand curve mechanism for facilities assigned a non-zero CRM value (see Appendix II for additional details regarding the proposed six-step design)
 - Expressly accommodates the various non-zero CRM values currently utilized in the market.
 - Establishes consistent cost values for shortages based on specified percentage values of the CRM.
 - The final "step" of the revised demand curve mechanism will price all shortages in excess of the CRM, thereby eliminating reliance on constraint relaxation for resolving facilities assigned a non-zero CRM value.



Proposed Six-Step Transmission Demand Curve Structure



Proposed Transmission Demand Curve Structure

 The table below represents the proposed six-step transmission demand curve mechanism MW/pricing structure applied to the nonzero CRM values currently used in the market:

		Proposed Demand Curve Steps													
CRM Value	,		•		3 (60% of CRM Value in MW)		•		•	5 Cost Value (\$/MWH)	6 (>100% of CRM Value in MW)	6 Cost Value (\$/MWH)			
10 MW CRM	2	\$200	4	\$300	6	\$600	8	\$1,500	10	\$2,500	>10	\$4,000			
20 MW CRM	4	\$200	8	\$300	12	\$600	16	\$1,500	20	\$2,500	>20	\$4,000			
30 MW CRM	6	\$200	12	\$300	18	\$600	24	\$1,500	30	\$2,500	>30	\$4,000			
50 MW CRM	10	\$200	20	\$300	30	\$600	40	\$1,500	50	\$2,500	>50	\$4,000			
100 MW CRM	20	\$200	40	\$300	60	\$600	80	\$1,500	100	\$2,500	>100	\$4,000			



Summary of Transmission Demand Curve Description

- The first three steps of the curve should capture 99% of the historical cost of solving the transmission system through physical re-dispatch.
 - Supporting analysis determined that 99% of transmission constraints are resolved at approximately \$588 per MWh or less for the historic study period (July 2017 – February 2018)
 - The fourth step should be established at a value that facilitates appropriate tradeoffs between products/services.
 - For example, supporting analysis determined that \$1,500 per MWh would facilitate trading off SENY 30-minute reserves to secure certain SENY transmission constraints
- The value of the fifth step is intended to provide for continued pricing increases for worsening levels of shortage between steps 4 and 6.
 - The sixth and final step on the curve is set at \$4,000 per MWh.
 - This value would be used to price all shortages in excess of the CRM value, replacing reliance on relaxation for facilities assigned a non-zero CRM value

Market Design Concept Proposal: Current Internal Zero Value CRM Facilities




Market Design Concept Proposal

- Current Internal Zero Value CRM Facilities: The NYISO proposes to apply a non-zero CRM value to internal facilities currently assigned a zero value CRM and utilize a separate demand curve mechanism for such facilities (see Appendix III for additional details regarding the proposed transmission demand curve design).
 - These facilities would not utilize the six-step demand curve mechanism proposed for all other facilities assigned a non-zero CRM value.
 - The NYISO proposes to apply a two-step transmission demand curve to these facilities.
 - Since many of these facilities are located out of generation complexes a small non-zero CRM value is being proposed to avoid unnecessarily reserving the available capability of these facilities.

Proposed Two-Step Transmission Demand Curve Structure

Proposed transmission demand curve for internal facilities currently assigned a zero value CRM:



- Up to 5 MW is priced at \$100 per MWh.
- >5 MW is priced at \$2,000 per MWh.



Market Design Concept Proposal: External Interfaces



Market Design Concept Proposal

 External Interfaces: The NYISO will continue use of the current single value \$4,000 per MW shadow price capping mechanism for external interfaces (i.e., the current pricing logic for facilities assigned a zero value CRM).

Rationale:

- NERC rules require external interfaces to be scheduled to the same limit as the neighboring control areas.
- Applying a demand curve mechanism for external interfaces is not appropriate as the only resources available for commitment are transactions and the Real-Time Dispatch converts transactions to fixed interchange in which there are no resources available.
- Due to the need to schedule to the same limit with external interfaces a CRM is not applied.



Next Steps



Next Steps

November/December 2019

 Continue to review and discuss proposed enhancements to the current transmission constraint pricing logic

December 2019

Present market design proposal at BIC

2020

- Continue with development and review supporting tariff changes
- Complete Consumer Impact Analysis



Feedback/Questions?

Email additional feedback to:
 Debbie Eckels, deckels@nyiso.com



The Mission of the New York Independent System Operator, in collaboration with its stakeholders, is to serve the public interest and provide benefits to consumers by:

- Maintaining and enhancing regional reliability
- Operating open, fair and competitive wholesale electricity markets
- Planning the power system for the future
- Providing factual information to policy makers, stakeholders and investors in the power system



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Appendix I: Current Transmission Constraint Pricing Logic

Current TCP Logic

- The NYISO assigns a CRM to facilities and interfaces to help manage transmission modeling uncertainty.
 - The CRM value represents a reduction to the appropriate transmission facility rating or interface limit that is used to set the effective limit in the market software
 - Non-zero CRM values are applied to facilities to account for Generation and Load uncertainty, and unscheduled loop flows in the Real-Time Dispatch scheduling horizon.
 - Zero-CRM values are applied to facilities that are generally located within a generation pocket or at an external interface and therefore are not able to provide a significant amount of margin on a transmission limit.



Current TCP Logic

- In situations where insufficient resource capacity is available to fully resolve a constraint, "relaxation" is applied.
 - To determine the applicable shadow cost for the transmission constraint, the applicable limit for the facility is increased to a value equal to the flow that can be achieved on the constraint by the available resources (including the 20 MW of relief from the demand curve mechanism, if applicable), plus 0.2 MW



Appendix II: Rationale for the Proposed Transmission Demand Curve Structure for Non-Zero CRM Facilities



Rationale for the First Three Steps

- The following methodology was used to support the derivation of the proposed values for the first three steps of the revised transmission demand curve:
 - Data presented on the following slide was derived from all RTD binding transmission constraints from July 2017 through February 2018 (i.e., the data period from the 2018 study)
 - The following data filters were applied:
 - This data includes constraints resolved with shortage MW, excluding any Shadow Price that was set by the current graduated Transmission Shortage Cost mechanism (i.e., Shadow Prices equal to \$350, \$1,175 and \$4,000 per MWh were removed from the dataset)
 - "shortage MW" means the sum of any demand curve MW provided through the graduated Transmission
 Shortage Cost mechanism and any relaxation MW (i.e., constraint relaxation) that were relied upon to relieve a transmission constraint
 - Constraints with Shadow Price of less than \$1.00 per MWh were also removed from the dataset



Rationale for the First Three Steps

Maximum Shadow Price at:	Number of Constraints in Grouping	95%		97%		99%		Standar		Standard Deviation	Media Shadov Price	
All Constraints	84,260	\$	198.15	\$	267.97	\$	588.42	143	\$	20.39		
	Vol	tage Leve	el									
Interfaces	10,462	\$	226.33	\$	261.77	\$	380.57	99	\$	49.73		
345 kV	20,688	\$	114.03	\$	158.57	\$	304.84	166	\$	16.72		
230 kV	1,322	\$	713.98	\$	985.90	\$	2,340.09	418	\$	114.54		
138 kV	51,255	\$	197.15	\$	285.08	\$	588.44	121	\$	17.77		
115 kV	533	\$	285.18	\$	423.42	\$	506.04	114	\$	91.54		
CRM Value												
100	10,462	\$	226.33	\$	261.77	\$	380.57	99	\$	49.73		
50	11,263	\$	161.65	\$	243.39	\$	713.98	228	\$	12.92		
30	15,281	\$	185.69	\$	244.47	\$	331.04	81	\$	22.21		
20	41,869	\$	206.51	\$	323.19	\$	600.14	139	\$	17.76		
0	5,385	\$	63.23	\$	72.91	\$	101.16	143	\$	1.05		
		L	ocation									
West	530	\$ 1	1,159.88	\$	2,211.78	\$	3,583.55	612	\$	157.82		
Central	5,132	\$	62.53	\$	69.29	\$	96.19	137	\$	23.65		
North	1,730	\$	242.79	\$	278.67	\$	432.27	176	\$	55.12		
Mohawk	216		3,133.38	\$	3,267.71	\$	3,651.33	1009	\$	81.25		
Capital	10,404	\$	234.30	\$	277.58	\$	451.17	105	\$	50.85		
Hudson Valley	998	\$	219.13	\$	423.64	\$	1,541.35	255	\$	36.87		
Dunwoodie	429	\$	204.82	\$	215.14	\$	239.62	68	\$	49.76		
NYC	40,358	\$	175.33	\$	262.20	\$	588.65	127	\$	14.93		
Ш	24,463	\$	201.04	\$	255.20	\$	382.77	90	\$	21.25		

- Data in the chart represents constraints resolved through the re-dispatch of physical resources.
 - Constraints with Shadow Prices equal to the pricing values of the "steps" of the current graduated Transmission Shortage Cost mechanism were excluded.
- The table shows that 99% of the binding RTD constraints resolved through the redispatch of physical resources for the study period were resolved at a Shadow Price of \$588.42 or less.



Rationale for the Fourth and Fifth Steps

- In the security constrained economic unit commitment and dispatch algorithms, the objective is to minimize overall production cost while satisfying all applicable constraints.
- The software is required to coordinate and co-optimize Energy and reserve products.
- The NYISO reviewed certain potential trade-offs between Energy and reserve products to provide insight.
- For example, the following slide provides information related to an assessment of reserve and Energy (transmission) trade-offs for the Leeds-Pleasant Valley constraint.



Rationale for the Fourth and Fifth Steps

- An RTD interval was evaluated involving the Leeds-PV line for the loss of Athens-PV line constraint, during a period with little surplus of SENY 30-Minute Reserves
- A simulation was used to determine the price level at which the economic dispatch would begin going short of SENY 30-minute reserves and converting that reserve to energy to solve the transmission overload.
 - The assessment incrementally increased the current \$1,175 per MW price point of the graduated Transmission Shortage Cost mechanism.
 - The case was rerun until the economic dispatch started converting the SENY 30-minute reserve to energy
 - This occurred at a value of approximately \$1,500 per MW considering an average shift factor of approximately 33% for SENY units on the Leeds-PV constraint.
- After determining an appropriate value for the fourth step, a value for the fifth step was derived to help provide for a graduated price increase between the fourth and final (sixth) step



Rationale for the Last Step

- The current \$4,000 per MW maximum Shadow Cost value remains appropriate and should be retained
 - This value remains sufficient to facilitate efficient re-dispatch of higher cost physical resources
 - For example, this pricing value would be sufficient to facilitate redispatch of a GT with at 25% shift factor and a cost of \$1,000 per MWh
 - To eliminate reliance on constraint relaxation for facilities assigned a non-zero CRM value, this final step is extended to provide pricing for transmission shortages beyond 100% of the applicable CRM value



Appendix III: Rationale for the **Proposed Transmission** Demand Curve Structure for **Current Internal Zero CRM Facilities**



Rationale for First Step

Maximum Shadow Price at:	Number of Constraints in Grouping	95%		97%		99%		Standard Deviation	Median Shadow Price	
All Constraints	84,260	\$	198.15	\$	267.97	\$	588.42	143	\$	20.39
		Vol	tage Leve	el						
Interfaces	10,462	\$	226.33	\$	261.77	\$	380.57	99	\$	49.73
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LI	24,463	\$	201.04	\$	255.20	\$	382.77	90	\$	21.25

The table shows that 99% of the binding RTD constraints related to zero value CRM facilities that were resolved through the re-dispatch of physical resources for the study period (July 2017-February 2018) were resolved at a Shadow Price of \$101.16 or less.



Rationale for Second Step

- The NYISO proposes to implement a \$2,000 per MW maximum Shadow Cost value for internal facilities currently assigned a zero value CRM.
 - This value is sufficient to facilitate efficient re-dispatch of higher cost physical resources
 - For example, this pricing value would be sufficient to facilitate the redispatch of generators that have greater than 50% shift factors and a cost of \$1,000 per MWh
 - Higher shift factors are typical for resources that are able to relieve a constraint located in export constrained areas

